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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MA in Art Law and Economy at the In-
ternational Hellenic University.  
The research question of this study is to comparatively analyze the most signifi-
cant international criminal provisions, which establish individual criminal responsibility 
for war crimes against cultural property. The initial step is to elaborate on the norma-
tive origins of the relevant customary IHL principles, with the purpose of conceiving 
the substance of the criminal provisions. The critical analysis is further justified 
through an established theoretical construction of distinction among the international 
legal instruments, on the ground of their specific characteristics. The civilian-use ap-
proach followed by the ad hoc criminal tribunals and the international permanent 
criminal court has proved to be less successful in comparison to the cultural-value ori-
entation of the 1999 Second Protocol. The responsibility to protect cultural objects is 
evident also in the context of an occupation regime. In this regard, reference is made 
to judgements of domestic jurisdiction, which reveal the acknowledgement of the legal 
obligation of an occupying power to protect the national treasures of the occupied 
state.  
I would like to thank Dr. Miltiadis Sarigiannidis, for accepting to be my supervisor 
to this Dissertation Thesis and for contributing to the realization of this study with his 
insightful remarks and comments. 
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Preface 
The realization of the need for protection of cultural property in the event of war 
has international dimensions. The concern of the international community towards 
destructive acts against valuable cultural property is triggered by the recent attacks in 
Aleppo and Palmyra by extremist groups. Taking into consideration the reflection of 
the disastrous effects on cultural identity and dignity on the nations, the need for 
international criminal remedies is undoubtful.  
Cultural property has become the object of legal protection by a multiplicity of le-
gal provisions which have gradually attained the status of customary international law. 
Yet, the core of the challenge towards the reinforcement of implementation of IHL lies 
within the successful application of international criminal law. 
 The recent Al Mahdi judgement of the international permanent criminal court on 
the destruction of culturally protected mosques and mausoleums in Mali raises inter-
national awareness on the need for criminalization of such destructive acts. The rela-
tively short history of the International Criminal Court has for the first time recalled the 
UNESCO Constitution to illustrate that the protected cultural objects were of “special 
significance to international cultural heritage”. The court further noted, that the “dif-
fusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are 
indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations 
must fulfill in spirit of mutual assistance and concern”. Such a reiteration by a respect-
ed international organ proves the gravity of preambular language of the UNESCO legal 
texts and their potential dynamic in legal practice. 
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Introduction 
The legal regime of international criminal law in the context of the protection 
of cultural property consists of customary rules shaped by state practice and opinio 
juris, or crystallized in the form of provisions in a multiplicity of international legal in-
struments.  
The ICC and especially the ICTY, illustratively and rigorously interpret and apply 
the rules of their respective Statutes. In chronological order, the ICTY convicted three 
high ranking perpetrators of crimes against cultural property. In 2000 it delivered a 
judgement to sentence General Blaskic Tihomir on charges pertinent to destruction of 
cultural sites. In 2004, Vice Admiral Jokic Miodrag was sentenced for directing an at-
tack against the Old City of Dubrovnik, Croatia. In 2005 the ICTY sentenced the com-
mander of the Yugoslav army forces Strugar Pavle also for acts against the Old City of 
Dubrovnik.  
In the analysis to follow, I shall attempt to elaborate on the characteristics of 
each criminal provision and the applied case law, with the purpose of conducting a 
fruitful comparison and propose solutions for improvement.  
The arguments of this study allow the reader to grasp some vulnerable points 
of the Rome Statute which mirror the strong elements of other legal instruments. For 
instance, there are reasons to make the conclusion that the provisions of the Rome 
Statute on cultural property are unprecise, vague and general. The respective provi-
sions in the ICTY Statue are also of a rather generic nature and there is a lack of gradu-
ation in gravity of the offences. Consequently, the jurisprudence of the ICTY is based 
on the same legal provision without distinction as to the gravity of the perpetrated of-
fence.  
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Chapter I: The protection of cultural property under customary IHL 
Cultural property has become the object of legal protection by a multiplicity of le-
gal provisions which have gradually attained the status of customary international law 
as dictated by state practice and opinio juris.1 
A) Attacks against cultural property (practice relating to Rule 38) 
Per Rule 38 of customary international humanitarian law (hereinafter referred to 
as ”IHL”): “Each party to the conflict must respect cultural property: A. Special care 
must be taken in military operations to avoid damage to buildings dedicated to reli-
gion, art, science, education or charitable purposes and historic monuments unless they 
are military objectives. B. Property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every 
people must not be the object of attack unless imperatively required by military neces-
sity.” This Rule derives from multiple treaties and other instruments dating back to 
18992 and the practice of international judicial bodies3. 
                                                     
1 Henckaerts Jean-Marie and Louise Doswald – Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol-
ume II: Practice, Part I pp. 723-813. 
2 1899 Hague Rules, Article 27; 1907 Hague Rules, Article 27; 1907 Hague Convention IX, Article 56; 1935 
Roerich Pact, Articles 1, 5; 1954 Hague Convention Articles 1, 4, 19, 28; 1977 AP I, Articles 53, 85 (4) (d); 
1977 AP II Article 16; Rome Statute, Articles 8 (2) (b) (ix), (e) (iv); 1999 Second Protocol, Articles 1 (b), 6, 
7, 15. 
3 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals 
Chamber Decision, 2 October 1995, paras. 98, 127: Article 19 of the 1954 Hague Convention, which pro-
vides for the application of the provisions of the Convention relating to respect for cultural property “as 
a minimum” in non-international armed conflicts, constitutes a treaty rule which has “gradually become 
part of customary law” […] “it cannot be denied that customary rules have developed to govern internal 
strife. These rules […] cover such areas as […] protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural proper-
ty”; Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic & Ratko Mladic, IT-95-5-R61 & IT-95-18-R61, Review of the Indict-
ments pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Trial Chamber Judgement, 11 July 
1996, paras. 6, 15: […] “the destruction of sacred sites is characterized as a violation of laws or customs 
of war” which lay within the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal […] “a total of 1,123 mosques, 504 
Catholic churches and five synagogues were destroyed or damaged [by Bosnian Serb forces], for the 
most part, in the absence of military activity or after the cessation thereof.”; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-
14, Trial Chamber Judgement, 3 March 2000, para. 185: With regard to destruction or wilful damage to 
institutions dedicated to religion or education, “[t]he damage or destruction must have been committed 
intentionally to institutions which may clearly be identified as dedicated to religion or education and 
which were not being used for military purposes at the time of the acts. In addition, the institutions 
must not have been in the immediate vicinity of military objectives.”; Prosecutor v. Kordic and Cerkez, 
IT-95-14/2, Trial Chamber Judgement, 26 February 2001, paras. 360, 362: With regard to institutions 
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B) Use of cultural property for military purposes (practice relating to Rule 39) 
Per Rule 39 of customary IHL: “The use of property of great importance to the cul-
tural heritage of every people for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction 
or damage is prohibited, unless imperatively required by military necessity.” This Rule is 
the derivative of evident state practice in the adoption of legal instruments4 and noto-
rious war incidents.5  
                                                                                                                                                           
dedicated to education, the Chamber stated that “[they] are undoubtedly immovable property of great 
importance to the cultural heritage of peoples in that they are without exception centers of learning, 
arts, and sciences, with their valuable collections of books and works of art and science” and referred to 
the Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments (“Roerich 
Pact”, 1935).  With reference to the 1954 Hague Convention the Chamber further noted that there is 
little difference between the conditions for the according of general protection and those for the provi-
sion of special protection” by reason of the fact that “the fundamental principle is that protection of 
whatever type will be lost if cultural property, including educational institutions, is used for military pur-
poses, and this principle is consistent with the custom codified in Article 27 of the Hague Regulations”.   
4 1907 Hague Rules, Article 23 (g): “[I]t is especially forbidden […] To destroy or seize the enemy’s prop-
erty unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”; 1954 
Hague Convention, Article 4 (2): “The obligations mentioned in paragraph 1 [respect for cultural proper-
ty] of the present Article may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires 
such a waiver.”; 1949 Geneva Convention IV, Article 53: “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of 
real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to 
other public authorities, or to social or co-operative organizations, is prohibited, except where such de-
struction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.”; 1999 Second Protocol, Article 6 (b): 
“[A] waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity pursuant to Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Con-
vention may only be invoked to use cultural property for purposes which are likely to expose it to de-
struction or damage when and for as long as no choice is possible between such use of the cultural 
property and another feasible method for obtaining a similar military advantage.”. 
5 UK, Letter dated 21 January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22215, 28 
January 1991, p. 1: “British commanders have been briefed on the locations and significance of sites of 
religious and cultural importance in Iraq, and operations will take account of this.”; UK, Letter dated 28 
January 1991 to the President of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/22156, 28 January 1991, p. 1: “the 
entire campaign has been conducted against military infrastructure [… ] with specific briefing to avoid 
sites of cultural and historic significance.”; US, Memorandum from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 26 
May 1944, reprinted in US, Annotated Supplement to the Naval Handbook (1997), para. 8.5.1.6, foot-
note 122: “Shortly we will be fighting our way across the Continent of Europe in battles designed to pre-
serve our civilization. Inevitably, in the path of our advance will be found historical monuments and cul-
tural centers which symbolize to the world all that we are fighting to preserve. It is the responsibility of 
every commander to protect and respect these symbols whenever possible. In some circumstances the 
success of the military operation may be prejudiced in our reluctance to destroy these revered objects. 
Then, as at Cassino [17 January - 18 May 1944], where the enemy relied on our emotional attachments 
to shield his defense, the lives of our men are paramount. So, where military necessity dictates, com-
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In an initial effort to perceive the gist of the concept of “military necessity”, refer-
ence is made to the travaux preparatoires of the revised Lauswolt document6 and the 
Expert Meeting on the Revision of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (hereinafter referred to as “1954 
                                                                                                                                                           
manders may order the required action even though it involves destruction of some honored site. But 
there are many circumstances in which damage and destruction are not necessary and cannot be justi-
fied. In such cases, through the exercise of restraint and discipline, commanders will preserve centers 
and objects of historical and cultural significance. Civil Affairs Staffs at higher echelons will advise com-
manders of the locations of historical monuments of this type, both in advance of the front lines and in 
occupied areas.”; US, Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian 
Gulf War, Appendix O, the Role of the Law of War, 10 April 1992, ILM, Vol. 31, 1992, pp. 621-622: The 
US Department of Defense stated that the coalition operations took place in an area “near many ar-
chaeological sites of great cultural significance”, encompassing “the cradle of civilization” and the aim of 
the operations was to balance maximum possible protection of these sites, against protection of the 
Coalition lives and the accomplishment of the assigned mission.  “Imperative military necessity may oc-
cur when an enemy uses cultural property and its immediate surrounding to protect legitimate military 
targets in violation of Article 4(1)…cultural and civilian objects are protected from direct, intentional 
attack, unless they are used for military purposes, such as shielding military objects from attack.”; US 
Statement before the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/47/SR.9, 6 October 
1992, p.11, para. 51: “the coalition forces in the Gulf conflict, desiring to spare the historic temples at 
Ur, had not bombed them even though MiG aircraft had been stationed there”; US, Department of De-
fense, Report to Congress on International Policies and Procedures Regarding the Protection of Natural 
and Cultural Resources During Times of War, 19 January 1993, pp. 202, 204-205: “the Iraqi forces were 
using cultural property within its control to shield military objects from attack, a classical example being 
the ancient temple  of Ur. Although according to the US the law of war permitted the attack, and alt-
hough each could have been destroyed utilizing precision-guided munitions, US commanders recognized 
that the aircraft for all intents and purposes were incapable of military operations from their position, 
and elected against their attack for fear of collateral damage to the temple” [...] “steps were taken to 
minimize collateral damage, such as intelligence collection based on very scarce resources, the prepara-
tion of a “no-strike” target list, placing known cultural objects off limits from attack, as well as some 
otherwise legitimate targets if attack of the latter might place nearby cultural property at risk of dam-
age, the annotation of target folders regarding near-by cultural property and the utilization of large-
format maps with “non-targets” such as cultural property highlighted” […] “aircraft and munitions were 
selected so that attacks on targets in proximity to cultural objects would provide the greatest possible 
accuracy and the least risk of collateral damage to the cultural property” […] “Aircrews attacking targets 
in proximity to cultural property were directed not to expend their munitions if they lacked positive 
identification of their targets”. 
6 Draft provisions for the revision of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict, UNESCO Headquarters, Paris 24-27 March 1997, CLT-97/CONF.208/2, 
Paris, October 1997. 
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Hague Convention”) 7 which shed some light as interpretative tools.8  France expressed 
the view that “military necessity” is permitted only due to express provisions,9 it 
should be maintained in the Articles 4 (2) and 11 (2) of the 1954 Hague Convention10 
and it should mean that it is not permitted to use more violence than absolutely nec-
essary.11 According to further statements of France, military necessity, being a concept 
of IHL, should equally apply towards attacks against all kinds of cultural property and it 
should not be perceived as an attack on the general principle of limitation which regu-
lates the acts of a state, but rather as an additional guarantee towards the realization 
of that principle. Military necessity is not an arbitrary concept; it is strictly shaped by 
four cumulative circumstances: a) it should only be foreseen by legal provisions, b) it 
should be limited in time, c) it should justify only the means which are indispensable to 
achieve the aim and d) it should be applied by means which are legal.12  The state-
ments of Germany during the Working Group in Vienna are also worthwhile in this re-
spect: “military necessity” is not a means to bypass the law, but it is subject to IHL, 
mirroring the legally inevitable compromise between humanitarian and military re-
quirements.13 
Some confusion derives from the incompatibility in legal terminology among “mili-
tary necessity” and “military effort”. The wording “military effort” is present in Article 
53 of Additional Protocol I and in Article 16 of Additional Protocol II 1977 to the Gene-
                                                     
7 UNESCO Meeting of Governmental Experts on the Revision of the Hague Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, Vienna, 11-13 May 1998, UNESCO Document 
Paris, May 1998, Final Report.  
8 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded at Vienna, 23 May 1969, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, Article 32: Recourse to the preparatory work of a treaty [or other legal 
document] as a supplementary means of interpretation.  
9 France, Observations on the Revised Lauswolt Document, UNESCO Doc. DLT.97/CONF.208/2, October 
1997, para. 1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 France, Position paper submitted to the Expert Meeting on the Revision of the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion, Vienna, 11-13 May 1998, para. 2. 
12 France, Working document on military necessity submitted to the Expert Meeting on the Revision of 
the 1954 Hague Convention, Vienna, 11-13 May 1998, paras. 1-5. 
13 Germany, Position paper concerning a revision of the 1954 Hague Convention, 1977, pp. 2-3. 
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va Conventons 1949 (hereinafter referred to as “1977 AP I” and “1977 AP II”).14 Ac-
cording to the interpretation given by many states15, “military effort” means “military 
purposes”, or “military uses”, whereas Canada16 conceives the wording “military ef-
fort” as being synonymous to “imperative military necessity”. The legal question of 
which concept is doctrinally preferred is also a matter of merit. Considering Article 27 
(g) of the 1907 Hague Convention and Article 53 of the 1949 Geneva Convention IV 
which establish customary IHL, accepted by subsequent state practice,17 and verbatim 
recalled in other international instruments,18 an attack against cultural property shall 
be excused under the circumstance that imperative “necessities” of war allow recourse 
to such a waiver, and not merely the “usage” of cultural property for the “purposes” of 
war. 
However, as per the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter re-
ferred to as “ICRC”), the discrepancy among the two wording expressions is not of par-
amount importance. Per its point of view, the material scope of application of Article 
53 of 1977 API or Article 16 of 1977 AP II, encompasses cultural property which is part 
of the cultural or spiritual heritage of “peoples”, meaning the humanity, therefore the 
ambit is restricted and the result of practical application of the concept “military ef-
                                                     
14 1977 AP I, Article 53: “Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, and of other relevant international 
instruments, it is prohibited: (b) to use such objects [historic monuments, works of art or places of wor-
ship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples] in support of the military effort.; 1977 
AP I, Article 16: “Without prejudice to the provision of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cul-
tural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited […] to use [historic monu-
ments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples] in 
support of the military effort. 
15 Ireland, Declarations and reservations made upon ratification of AP I, 19 May 1999, para. 10; Italy, 
Declarations made upon ratification of AP I, 27 February 1986, para. 9; Netherlands, Declarations made 
upon ratification of AP I, 26 June 1987, para. 8; UK, Declarations made upon signature of AP I, 12 De-
cember 1977, para. g; Reservations and declarations made upon ratification of AP I, 28 January 1998, 
para. k. 
16 Canada, Reservations and statements of understanding made upon ratification of AP I, 20 November 
1990, para. 9. 
17 See supra 12. 
18 1991 Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of IHL between Croatia and the SFRY, para. 
6; 1992 Agreement on the Application of IHL between the Parties to the Conflict in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, para. 2.5. 
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fort” is limited. On the contrary, the 1954 Hague Convention, extends its scope of ap-
plication to cover cultural property which forms part of the cultural heritage of “every 
people”, meaning “each nation” and not necessarily for the mankind.19 
C) Export and return of cultural property in occupied territory (practice relating 
to Rule 41) 
Per Rule 41 of customary IHL: “The occupying power must prevent the illicit export 
of cultural property from occupied territory and must return illicitly exported property 
to the competent authorities of the occupied territory.” State practice has established 
this customary norm as applicable in the context of international armed conflict. As 
significant examples stand resolutions issued by the UN Security Council,20 which acted 
under the mandate of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, resolutions of the General As-
sembly21 and reports of the Secretary General22  with regard to the obligation of Iraq 
and Israel to return all Kuwaiti property seized during the Gulf War.  
Chapter II: Commentary on the Additional Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and criminal responsibility  
                                                     
19 International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC databases on international humanitarian law, Cus-
tomary IHL, 2017, Rule 39, available online: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule39, (last visited on: 31 March 2017).   
20 UN Security Council, Res. 686, 2 March 1991, para. 2 (d): “immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti 
property seized by Iraq, the return to be completed in the shortest possible period.” 
21 UN General Assembly, Res. 46/47, 9 December 1991, Part A, paras. 8 (h), 25-26: “Israel, the occupying 
power, return immediately all documents and papers that were taken away from the Sharia Islamic 
Court in occupied Jerusalem, to the officials of the said Court.” 
22 UN Secretary-General, Further report on the status of compliance by Iraq with the obligations placed 
upon it under certain of the Security-Council resolutions relating to the situation between Iraq and Ku-
wait, UN Doc. S/23687, 7 May 1992: “The return of the property has commenced and, to date, proper-
ties of the Central Bank of Kuwait, the Central Library of Kuwait, the National Museum of Kuwait, the 
Kuwait News Agency … have been returned. A number of additional items are ready for return and the 
process is continuing. In addition, Kuwait has submitted lists of properties from other ministries, corpo-
rations and individuals that are being pursued. The Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials involved with the return of 
property have extended maximum cooperation to the UN to facilitate the return.”; UN Secretary-
General, Second report pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999), UN Doc. S/2000/575, 14 
June 2000, paras. 17 (a), 20: “although Iraq had returned a substantial quantity of property since the 
end of the Gulf War, there remained “many items which Iraq is under obligation to return to Kuwait”. 
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A) Article 53 of the 1977 AP I 23 
According to Article 53 of 1977 AP I to the Geneva Conventions: “Without preju-
dice to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the event of armed conflict of 14 May 1954, and of other international instruments, it is 
prohibited: (a) to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments, 
works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of 
peoples; (b) to use such objects in support of the military effort; (c) to make such ob-
jects the object of reprisals.” 
 
a. The chapeau 
In light of the plenary sessions, the inclusion of the reservation clause derives from 
the need to vindicate rather than contradict to the pre-existing legal provisions. In 
practice, if there is an armed conflict among two states parties to both the 1954 Hague 
Convention (or another international instrument)24 and the1977 AP I, and the applica-
ble legal rules are contradictory, then the application of the first repeals the second, 
unless the parties to the conflict are not states parties to the 1954 Hague Convention 
or the applicable rules are complementary.   
 
b. The scope of application  
The special protection is available to three categories of cultural property, i.e., his-
toric monuments, works of art and places of worship, as long as they form part of the 
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. The cultural or spiritual character limits the 
scope of application to objects with such significance to a people, which surpasses ge-
ographical restraints of a specific country. For instance, not all religious sites qualify as 
cultural objects in this sense, because they may fail to supersede the local element and 
subsequently express the conscience of a nation. In dubious cases of determination of 
the value of an object, as a strong indicator serves the worth attributed by the people, 
                                                     
23 Sandoz Yves, Swinarski Christophe, Zimmermann Bruno, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, ICRC, Martinus Nijhof Publishers, Geneva 
1987, pp. 639-649, 1002-1003. 
24 For instance: 1907 Hague Rules, Articles 27, 56; 1935 Roerich Pact, Articles 1, 5. 
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whose heritage it is. The cultural element attaches, but is not limited to, historic mon-
uments or works of art, whereas the spiritual touch is mostly attributed to places of 
worship. As per the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
IHL Applicable in Armed Conflicts 1974-1977 (hereinafter referred to as: “the CDDH”), 
the wording “of peoples” relates to the respective people of a country 25 and not the 
country per se. The reasoning is the impediment of any hurdles against the worship of 
religious sites which may belong to minority groups and not the official religion of the 
respective country.   
       
c. i) The prohibition of Article 53 (a) 
It is legally prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against the protect-
ed objects of cultural property.26 For the purposes of this Article, an act of hostility 
means any act within the context of an international armed conflict which results in 
substantial damages or destruction of cultural property, such as a demolition, or which 
could have resulted in substantial damage or destruction, such as a directed attack 
against such property. Thus, a violation may take place irrespective of the effective-
ness of a directed attack.  
The legal prohibition to commit an attack under sub-paragraph (a) is stricter than 
the one provided for in Article 27 of the Hague Regulations 1907, which merely re-
quires “to spare, as far as possible”. It is also stricter compared to the same prohibition 
of Article 4 (2) of the 1954 Hague Convention, which permits the legal derogation of 
the afforded immunity for “imperative military necessity”. If both parties to the con-
flict are bound by both legal instruments, the reservation clause contained in the cha-
peau leads to the application of the waiver of immunity as per the 1954 Hague Con-
vention. If at least one state party is not bound by the 1954 Hague Convention, then as 
per the 1977 AP I the guarantee of “military objective” applies. This means that no at-
                                                     
25 A contrario, see Chapter I, supra 19, ICRC interpreting the wording “of peoples” as indicating the cul-
tural property with significance to the whole of human kind. 
26 The 1954 Hague Convention contains a similar provision in Article 4 (1): “by refraining from any act of 
hostility directed against such property” and the Roerich Pact in Article 1: the objects shall be “respect-
ed and protected by belligerents.” 
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tack against cultural property is permitted, if the cultural object is not made into a mili-
tary objective by those who are under its effective control. 
 
c.  ii) The criminal responsibility for the breach of Article 53 (a) according to Article 85 
(4) (d) 
The breach of the prohibition of sub-paragraph (a) constitutes a grave breach that 
attracts criminal responsibility. According to Article 85 (4) (d) of AP I: “making the 
clearly-recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which consti-
tute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples and to which special protection has 
been given by special arrangement, for example, within the framework of a competent 
international organization, the object of attack, causing as a result extensive destruc-
tion thereof, where there is no evidence of the violation by the adverse Party of Article 
53, sub-paragraph b), and when such historic monuments, works of art and places of 
worship are not located in the immediate proximity of military objectives.” Four cumu-
lative circumstances establish criminal responsibility:  
- First, a wilful attack against cultural property must have taken place. The inter-
pretation of the obscure wording “clearly recognized” has become a matter of contro-
versy among scholars. From the point of view of E. J. Roucounas, the objects should 
have been identifiable by the attacker at the time of the attack, whilst for J. de Breuck-
er the objects should have been recognized as legally protected. No matter which in-
terpretation prevails, at the end of the day, both scenarios verify two different prereq-
uisites of the same Article. In the first case, identifiability of a cultural object is a mat-
ter of intention to attack, whereas in the second case, legal recognition of the right to 
protection implies the existence of a special agreement.  
- Second, the objects must not have been used in support of the military effort 
(Article 53 (b)).  
- Third, the object must have been legally recognized as protected by a special 
agreement, for instance, under the auspices of an international organization. E.J. Rou-
counas proposed that the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage may constitute such an agreement.  
12 
 
- Fourth, the objects in question must not have been located in the immediate 
surroundings of any military objectives.  
- Fifth, extensive destruction of the objects must have been the effect of the at-
tack. 
 
d.  The prohibition of Article 53 (b) 
According to sub-paragraph (b) it is prohibited to use protected objects in support 
of the “military effort”.27 The concept of “military effort” is broadly shaped, including 
any use of the cultural objects in order to promote the conduct of war, either by bene-
fiting from their existence, such as shielding from the enemy (passive support), or by 
using them, for example in a defense activity (active support).  
The legal prohibition of using protected objects for the “military effort” in sub-
paragraph (b) is the necessary correspondence to the prohibition of undertaking any 
act of hostility directed against them in sub-paragraph (a). However, if during an 
armed conflict the party A breaches its obligation not to use a historic fortress as a de-
fense, this does not allow party B to direct the attack against the fortress in order to 
neutralize the enemy. The reason is the application of the safety net of Article 52 (2), 
which affords general protection of civil objects to the special protective regime of cul-
tural objects under Article 53. This means, that the attack against the historic fortress 
may only be justified, if all circumstances of Article 52 (2) are met.  
What is more, the general protective regime of Article 52 (2) also serves as addi-
tional safeguard for cultural objects that have been exempted from immunity, due to 
fulfilment of “imperative military necessity”, as per Article 4 (2) of the 1954 Hague 
Convention. This is a crucial development for the protection of cultural objects, be-
cause the use of cultural property for military purposes by a party, or even “imperative 
military necessity” should not be enough to justify its destruction by the forces of the 
adversary.  Yet, one cannot help but wonder what practical implications derive on the 
ground of the battlefield. 
                                                     
27 The 1954 Hague Convention contains a similar provision in Article 4 (1) which prohibits: “any use of 
the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes 
which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict.” 
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Apart from the application of Article 52 of AP I, there are other additional safe-
guards of IHL to consider, such as the precautionary measures28 of Article 57 of AP I, as 
well as the principle of proportionality, which means that the destruction caused 
should not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antic-
ipated. 
 
e.  The prohibition of Article 53 (c) 
Sub-paragraph (c) prohibits the making of the protected objects the object of re-
prisals.29 In jus in bello, reprisals can be defined as unlawful30, strict and severe 
measures undertaken by a belligerent party to the conflict against the adversary, fol-
lowing a breach of the law by the latter31, in order to compel it to alteration of its mili-
tary conduct32, either in a way to end breaches of law, or to pay for the reparations 
generating from such breaches. The first legal crystallization of the prohibition of re-
prisals regarded prisoners of war and later the prohibition expanded to cover all cate-
gories of protected persons and objects under the four Geneva Conventions 33. The 
1954 Hague Convention entailed a total prohibition of reprisals against cultural proper-
ty in Article 4 (4). Yet, the Diplomatic Conference held it was necessary to include a 
                                                     
28 Hensel H., The Law of Armed Conflict: Constraints on the Contemporary Use of Military Force, (Global 
Interdisciplinary Studies Series, 2007), p.75: The Department of Defense Report on the Conduct of the 
Persian Gulf War stated that target intelligence analysts had produced joint no-fire target-list as a com-
pilation of historical, religious, archaeological, economic and other politically sensitive institutions in Iraq 
and Kuwait that could not be targeted. Officers were prohibited from targeting, if the collateral damage 
was too high. 
29 See supra 23, pp. 982-987. 
30 The unlawful character of the responsive measures of reprisals is opposed to the lawfulness of the 
undertaken acts in the context of retortion. 
31 The purpose of punishment in reprisals is not a sine qua non prerequisite in straightforward reciproci-
ty. 
32 The purpose of forcible change of conduct in reprisals distinguishes them from acts of self-defense, 
which aim at immediate rebuttal of the attack. 
33 In 1916 the ICRC proposed the total prohibition of reprisals against prisoners of war, in view of the 
massive hostilities during the First World War. In 1929, the Diplomatic Conference approved the pro-
posal of the ICRC regarding prisoners of war and finally in 1949 led to the inclusion of the prohibition for 
the protected categories of persons and objects under all four Geneva Conventions, in Articles 46, 47, 19 
(3) and 33 (3) respectively. 
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similar provision in AP I, due to the then lack of international enforcement of the 1954 
Hague Convention and the short wording of its respective legal provision.       
 
B) Article 16 of the 1977 AP II34 
 
Article 16 of the 1977 AP II for the protection of cultural property in the event of a 
non-international armed conflict is the counterpart of Article 53 of the 1977 AP I, 
which applies in the context of an international armed conflict. Due to the lack of any 
criminal provision in the body of AP II, the author shall only pinpoint a few conclusions, 
which mainly derive from a comparative point of view.  
The scope of application of Article 16 of the 1977 AP II is the same as in Article 53 
of the 1977 of the AP I, meaning that all three categories of property should be pro-
tected, as long as the constitute the most important ones, especially the places of wor-
ship, which has been a matter of controversy among delegations.35  
The legal question of whether the meaning of Article 1 of 1954 Hague Convention 
to property “of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people” is substan-
tially the same as property of “cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples” in Article 16 AP 
II, (or 53 AP I) should be negatively answered for three reasons: First, both Protocols 
insert the “spiritual” element and a category of “places of worship” which are not pre-
sent in the 1954 Hague Convention. Therefore, the definition is more precise and thus, 
narrower. Second, both the 1977 Additional Protocols do not foresee any derogation 
from the prohibition of attacks against cultural property. Thus, they provide for more 
“generous” protection unlike the 1954 Hague Convention.36 This seems to suggest, for 
the purposes of legal balance, that the protected objects in the Additional Protocols 
are fewer, maybe akin to the property under special protection of Article 8 of 1954 
Hague Convention.  
                                                     
34 See supra 23, pp. 1465-1470. 
35 According to some delegations, all places of worship should be included in the protective ambit of 
Article 16 of the 1977 AP II. It was concluded to entail only the places of spiritual importance that repre-
sent the spiritual beliefs of a people, regardless of national borders. 
36 1954 Hague Convention, Article 4 (2) regarding the waiver of general protection: “imperative military 
necessity” and Article 11 (2) about the waiver of special protection: “unavoidable military necessity”. 
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Regardless of the narrower definition of cultural property in the Additional Proto-
cols, it should not be forgotten that the 1954 Hague Convention is more protective due 
to the listed prohibitions in Articles 3 and 19. 
Chapter III: The establishment of individual criminal responsibility by virtue of 
the 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention 1954 
The adoption of the 199 Second Protocol was the result of developments in inter-
national law37 that had taken place since the adoption of the Hague Convention 1954. 
The adoption of the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing 
the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970, the 
UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Her-
itage 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention”), 
the 1977 Additional Protocols 1977 and the inclusion of “cultural” war crimes in the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICC reflected such progresses.38  
The inadequacy of the Hague Convention 1954 that is concomitant to the estab-
lishment of individual criminal responsibility is evident in Article 28. Its wording re-
mains a dead letter, due to the absence of listing any specific violations that call for 
criminal sanctions and due to the imposition of the mere obligation on states to prose-
cute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions, as the states deem necessary.  
A) The material requirements 
In response to this deficiency, Article 15 of the 1999 Second Protocol sets up five 
concrete criminal acts as “serious violations” that call for sanctions, if they are commit-
ted intentionally and in violation of the Hague Convention or the 1999 Second Protocol 
itself. The criminal acts against cultural property are the following: (a) Making cultural 
property under enhanced protection the object of attack; (b) using cultural property 
                                                     
37 Preamble to the 1999 Second Protocol, para. 4: Considering that the rules governing the protection of 
cultural property in the event of armed conflict should reflect developments in international law. 
38 Chamberlain K., War and Cultural Heritage, Institute of Art and Law, 2004, pp. 168-174: The final pre-
paratory meeting for the drafting of the 1999 Second Protocol, hosted in Vienna in May 1998 by the 
Austrian Government identified five main areas to be addressed in the 1999 Second Protocol, including 
the exception of military necessity, precautionary measures, the system of special protection, institu-
tional issues and individual criminal responsibility.  
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under enhanced protection or its immediate surroundings in support of military action; 
(c) extensive damage, destruction or appropriation of cultural property protected un-
der the Convention and this Protocol; (d) making cultural property protected under the 
Convention and this Protocol the object of attack; (e) theft, pillage or misappropriation 
of, or acts of vandalism directed against cultural property protected under the Conven-
tion. In this way, the criminalization of specifically enlisted acts at a national level re-
quires that states legislate accordingly and establish national jurisdiction39 on prosecu-
tion40 or extradition41. 
Article 15 encompasses two categories of criminal offences that correspond to 
proposals made by Austria and the ICRC to the Working Group on Chapter 4.42 The first 
three offences of Article 15 (a) to (c) constitute a proposal on behalf of Austria and 
they are “grave breaches” found in the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 AP Addi-
tional Protocol I. The first two legal provisions (a) and (b) of Article 15 regard cultural 
property under the regime of “enhanced protection” and establish criminal responsi-
bility for the offenders of attacking or using such property or its immediate surround-
ings in favor of military action. In this way, the burden of criminal responsibility is 
placed equally on both attacker and defender. It should be noted at this point that the 
criminal offence of using cultural property or its immediate surroundings in favor of 
military action is not equal to the infliction of collateral damage to such property.43 The 
third offence of Article 15 (c) criminalizes the destruction or appropriation of cultural 
property, if they are extensive in nature. The last two criminal offences of Article 15 (d) 
and (e) constitute a proposal on behalf of the ICRC. The same offences constitute acts 
                                                     
39 1999 Second Protocol, Article 16. 
40 1999 Second Protocol, Article 17. 
41 1999 Second Protocol, Article 18. 
42 Henckaerts J.  M., New Rules for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, (International 
Review of the Red Cross), 30 September 1999 Article, No. 835, available online: 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jq37.htm, (last visited on: 31 March 
2017). 
43 During the Working Group on Chapter 4of the Second Protocol 1999, the Delegate from China had 
made the proposal to include a prohibition on inflicting collateral damage to cultural property under 
enhanced protection. The proposition was not approved, although the wording and the spirit of Article 
15 (b), [“not using…its immediate surroundings”] are relevant to the infliction of collateral damage. 
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of war crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter 
referred to as “the Rome Statute”). 
B) The mental requirements 
 
As per Article 15 of the 1999 Second Protocol the acts constitute “serious viola-
tions” of the same Protocol, if they are committed “intentionally”. The meaning of the 
terminology is that the offender must have acted consciously and with intent to the 
act and the consequences and it must have been willing to bring about such conse-
quences. The terminology “intentionally” encompasses also “recklessness”. “Reckless-
ness” is the state of mind in which the offender acts deliberately and knowing that a 
result may be a consequence of the act and even so commits the act. Negligence does 
not suffice for the establishment of individual criminal responsibility, but may lead to 
the imposition of disciplinary measures. An offender is negligent, if he carelessly di-
rects an attack against cultural property, without bearing in mind the act or its conse-
quences, although the result of the act was foreseeable at the time of its commission. 
The legal question on the fulfillment of the mental element depends on a factual basis 
and is a matter of available proof and evidence.  
C) The bases of jurisdiction 
 
The 1999 Second Protocol imposes on member states the obligation to take the 
necessary legislative measures to establish jurisdiction over the “serious violations” of 
Article 15, in the following cases: (a) when any of the five offences of Article 15 is 
committed in the territory of a member state; (b) when any of the five offences of Ar-
ticle 15 is committed by a national of a member state; (c) when any of the first three 
“serious offences” of Article 15 (a) to (c) is committed by an offender who is present in 
its territory. Thus, the 1999 Second Protocol establishes three kinds of jurisdiction 
based respectively on the principle of territoriality, theories of active personality and 
universal jurisdiction.  
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The establishment of universal jurisdiction44 means that the state where the of-
fender is present, is obliged to either prosecute or extradite that person, as per the aut 
dedere aut judicare principle. The establishment of universal jurisdiction for the re-
pression of the offences (a) to (c) of Article 15 is mandatory for the states, regardless 
of whether the offender is a national of the state exercising jurisdiction, or whether 
the offence took place within the territory of that state. The establishment of obligato-
ry universal jurisdiction in Article 15 of the 1999 Second Protocol derives from the 
matching of the relevant offences to the “grave breaches” in the sense of the Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto.45  Nonetheless, according to Article 
16 (2)(a), the states may as well establish universal jurisdiction for the last two “grave 
offences” (d) and (e) of Article 15 under the application of national or international 
law, including customary international law. This provision reflects the principle of per-
missive universal jurisdiction for war crimes which are “grave”, but do not amount to 
“grave breaches” in the technical sense of the Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocols. 
D) A critical analysis among the 1999 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention 
1954 and the 1977 AP I to the Geneva Conventions 1949 
The counterpart of Article 15 of the 1999 Second Protocol is found in Article 85 
(4)(d) of the 1977 AP I. Article 85 (4)(d) defines a “grave breach” on the battlefield 
which attracts individual criminal responsibility, flowing from the undertaking of an 
exclusively individual initiative, rather than a national policy.46 The wording of the “se-
                                                     
44 See supra 42. 
45 ICRC, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, Universal jurisdiction over war crimes, 
available online: https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/1086/universal-jurisdiction-icrc-eng.pdf, 
March 2014, (last visited on: 31 March 2017). 
46ICRC, Commentary of 1987 Repression of Breaches of this Protocol, available online: https://ihl-
data-
ba-
ses.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=7BBCFC2D471A1EAA
C12563CD00437805, (last visited on: 31/3/2017), paras.  3500-3501: Article 85 (4) subparagraphs (a), (b) 
and (c) of the 1977 AP I establish other “grave breaches” on the battlefield which are prejudicial against 
the rights of individuals under the control of the enemy and which attract individual criminal responsibil-
ity deriving from the policy decisions that are taken by the party to the conflict. 
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rious violations” of Article 15 of the 1999 Second Protocol is structured in similar form 
to the “grave breaches” of Article 85 (4) (d) of the 1977 AP I. Yet, these Articles differ 
remarkably. First, Article 85 (4)(d) is only applicable to criminal offences against cultur-
al property in the context of international armed conflicts,47 whereas Article 15 en-
compasses criminal acts against cultural objects in both legal contexts of international 
and non-international armed conflicts. Second, Article 85 (4)(d) restrictively conditions 
the establishment of the criminal act against cultural property on four factors48 which 
are not present in Article 15.49 Third, Article 15 includes offences that are not present 
in Article 85 (4)(d), such as the direction of an attack against cultural property of en-
hanced protection or its immediate surroundings in support of military action. Fourth, 
unlike the establishment of criminal responsibility by Article 85 (4)(d) of the 1977 AP I 
only for the breach of the prohibition of Article 53 (a), Article 15 of the 1999 Second 
Protocol equally weights criminal responsibility on the attacker and the defender.50 
The comparison among the two Articles leads to the legal conclusion that Article 15 of 
the 1999 Second Protocol is structured in a wider fashion. Thus, Article 15 provides for 
more protective guarantees in comparison to its counterpart Article 85 (4)(d).      
Chapter IV: The establishment of individual criminal responsibility for crimes 
against cultural property in virtue of the Rome Statute and the Statute of the ICTY 
This part of the analysis is dedicated to deliver the gist of the most important crim-
inal legal provisions of the respective instruments and some significant legal findings of 
the courts that have applied them in practiced. 
 
A) Acts against cultural property which constitute war crimes under the Rome 
Statute and respective jurisprudence 
                                                     
47 The 1977 AP II with regard to armed conflicts not of an international character in Article 16 prohibits 
acts of hostility directed against cultural objects and places of worship in support of the military effort, 
but does not have an Article for establishment of “grave breaches” like the 1977 AP I in Article 85 (4)(d). 
48See supra 46, paras. 3516-3517. 
49 See Chapter II, c. ii. 
50 Yet, Article 53 of the 1977 AP I equally places the burden on both the offender and the defender on 
the level of the establishment of legal prohibitions (a) and (b). 
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This part enumerates in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) war crimes against cultural 
property found in the Rome Statute, and applied by the ICC.51 The most significant 
judgement of the court is the recent case of Al Mahdi Al Faqi about the intentional di-
rection of attack against protected buildings, and some other judgements on the war 
crime of pillage. 
a. Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects in the context of an 
international armed conflict  
Article 8 para. 2 (b) (ii) establishes an act of war crime which is comprised by the 
following elements:52  
 
1. The perpetrator directed an attack  
2. The object of the attack were civilian objects, i.e., not military objectives  
3. The perpetrator intended such objects to be the object of the attack.  
 
The law of armed conflict elucidates the content of the term “attack”. According 
to Article 49 (1) of AP I, an attack is the undertaking of any acts of violence irrespective 
of whether committed by an aggressor or a party acting in self-defense.53 As regards 
acts of reprisals against civilians or civilian objects, it is clear that they constitute an 
“attack” within the context of which criminal responsibility for war crimes may occur, 
but what is not clear is, whether an attack in the form of reprisals is prohibited under 
customary international law.54 The prohibition of reprisals against civilians and civilian 
                                                     
51 Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, 3rd edition, Vol. 1, Sources, Subjects and Contents, pp. 
986-991. 
52 Dörmann Knutt, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A Commentary, ed. by Otto 
Triffterer & Kai Ambos, C.H. Beck, Hart, 3rd ed., Nomos, 2016, pp. 355-365. 
53 1977 AP I, Article 49 (1): "Attacks" means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or 
in defense. 
54 Contra, Prosecutor v. Kupreškic, IT-95-16-T, Judgement, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, paras. 527-
534: The tribunal stated that the principle of opinio iuris sive necessitatis may play a much greater role 
than the application of usus, and the Martens clause may obligate the states that have not implemented 
Article 52 (1) of the AP I to abide by the prohibition of reprisals against civilian objects. The Martens 
clause demonstrates how the principles of IHL may emerge through a customary process under the 
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objects reflects the “established framework of international law” within the chapeau 
of Article 8 (2) (b), but only for the member states of the Rome Statute which have 
acknowledged such a prohibition by means of statements or reservations made upon 
its ratification.55  
The object of the attack should be “military objectives”, in the sense of Article 52 
(2) AP I 1977, which establishes a two-fold test56: First, the nature, location, use or 
purpose of the object must make an effective contribution to the military action. Con-
tribution by nature, refers to the very existence of the object in and of itself. A cultural 
object may effectively contribute to the military action by its location and not its na-
ture, if for instance it is a bridge, a site or a structure tactically situated. Contribution 
by use refers to the present function of the object, whilst the purpose means future, 
concrete and not hypothetical use. The second prong of the test demands that its total 
or partial destruction/capture or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in 
the circumstances ruling at the time. Definite means that the advantage is concrete 
and perceptible rather than speculative.57 Yet, the term advantage entails an unavoid-
able anticipation, which, per state declarations upon ratification of the 1977 AP I, re-
fers to the entire attack, rather than isolated, or particular parts of the attack, but at 
the same time the anticipation should not extend as far as to cover the success of the 
entire war. 
The legal question of whether a “result” constitutes a legal requirement for the di-
rection of an attack against civilian objects was a matter of debate in the negotiations 
                                                                                                                                                           
pressure of the demands of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, even if state practice is incon-
sistent or inadequate.; Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, IT-95-11-R61, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to 
Rule 61, Judgement, Trial Chamber, 8 March 1996, paras. 10-18; Jones R.W.D. Jones, The practice of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 2nd ed., Transnational Publish-
ers, Inc. Ardsley, NY, 2000, pp. 97-98. 
55 UK Ministry of Defense, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, No. 16.34: The UK has made a res-
ervation to the chapeau of Article 8 (2) (b) and (e) regarding the interpretation of the “established 
framework of international law” by recalling its statements upon ratification of inter alia the 1977 AP I, 
Article 51 (6). 
56 Dörmann Knut, The conduct of hostilities, Revisiting the Law of Armed Conflict 100 Years after the 
1907 Hague Conventions and 30 Years after the 1977 Additional Protocols, ed. by Gian Luca Beruto, In-
ternational Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 6-8 September 2007, pp. 73, 77-82.  
57 See supra 55, No. 5.4.4. 
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for the adoption of the Elements of Crimes. The majority view indicated that the lack 
of reference by the Diplomatic Conference was purposeful and scholars propose that 
this view is in line with the explicit reference in other provisions of Article 8, such as in 
(2)(b)(vii). The minority view supported the implicit inclusion of a “result” in the mate-
rial requirements of the crime, in line with the grave breaches of its source in Article 85 
(4)(d) AP I 1977. At last, the majority view prevailed and its application is evident in the 
jurisprudence of the ICC.58  
The applicable mens rea of the crime derive from the term “intentionally direct-
ing” in Article 8 (2)(b)(ii) in combination with Article 30 of the Rome Statute. The 
phrase “intentionally directing” is significantly similar to “willfully” in Article 85 AP I59 
and “intentionally” in Article 15 of the 1999 Second Protocol60 and thus, encompasses 
both “intent” and “recklessness”. Under the preconditions of Article 30 of the Rome 
Statute, the perpetrator should act with both “intent” and “knowledge” in fulfillment 
of the cognitive and the voluntary element of mens rea, which should pertain both to 
the attack and the object of the attack.61  
 
b. Intentionally directing attacks against protected buildings in the context 
of an international armed conflict 
 
For the crimes in the context of international armed conflict, Article 8 (2)(b)(ix) es-
tablishes criminal responsibility for attacking buildings dedicated to religion, education, 
art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where 
sick and wounded are collected, if they do not constitute military objectives. As it has 
been analyzed, this legal violation has its roots in Articles 27 and 56 of the 1907 Hague 
                                                     
58 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, ICC-01/04-01-07, Decision, Pre-Trial Chamber, 30 September 2008, 
para. 270. 
59 See supra, Chapter II (A) (c) (ii). 
60 See supra, Chapter III (B). 
61 ICC, Elements of Crimes, Official Records of the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, Kampala, 31 May -11 June 2010, Article 8 (2) (b) (ii), Element 3: In the Elements 
of Crimes, the inclusion of the requirement that the perpetrator intended civilian objects (consequenc-
es) to be the object of the attack (conduct) is a duplication, which adds clarity to the legal conclusion 
that is drawn from Article 30 (2) (a) and (b) of the Rome Statute.  
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Rules62 and is repeated in the 1954 Hague Convention, the AP I 197763 and the 1999 
Second Protocol. 
 
The elements of the actus reus are:64 
1. The perpetrator directs an attack. 
2. The object falls under at least one of the enlisted categories65, which do not 
amount to military objectives. 
3. The perpetrator has intent for the attack and the object of the attack.66 
4. The perpetrator is aware of the existence of the context of armed conflict. 
 
The Rome Statute does not provide for a legal definition of what constitutes cul-
tural property, nor does it distinguish among different levels of legal protection of cul-
tural property depending on its significance, contrary to the approach of the legal in-
struments of the law of armed conflict.67 
 
c. Pillage in the context of an international armed conflict 
 
The normative origins of Article 8 (2)(b)(xvi) are among others traced at the 1907 
Hague Regulations and the Nuremberg Charter.68 The Elements of Crimes set up the 
following preconditions:69 
                                                     
62 See Chapter I, (A). 
63 See Chapter II, (A), Article 53 (1) AP I. 
64 See supra 52, pp. 416-421. 
65 ICC OTP, Situation in Mali, Article 53 (1) Report, 16 January 2013, p. 31: The Rome Statute does not 
clarify which definition of cultural property falls within its material jurisdiction, but the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the ICC in its Report for the initiation of the investigation in Mali as per Article 53 (1) of 
the Rome Statute, clearly invokes Article 53 (1) of the 1977 AP I regarding the act of war crime found in 
Article 8 (2) (e) (iv). 
66 Articles 8 (2) (e) (ii) and 30 Rome Statute: The perpetrator should mean to engage in the direction of 
the attack and be aware of: 1. the factual circumstances (not necessarily the legal evaluation) that afford 
the protected status to the objects of the attack and 2. that these objects do not constitute military ob-
jectives. 
67 See infra, Chapter IV, C on the contradiction among the “civil” and the “culture-specific” approach. 
68 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 28: “The pillage of a town or a 
village, even when taken by assault, is prohibited”; Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of 
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1. The perpetrator appropriates certain property. 
2. The perpetrator has the intention to deprive the previous owner from its own-
ership and appropriate the property for private or personal use. 
3. The appropriation is without the consent of the owner. 
 
As to the applicable mens rea of the crime, the perpetrator must have covered 
with general intent and knowledge of Article 30 the above-mentioned preconditions 1 
and 3, and with specific intent of Article 8 (2)(b)(xvi) the precondition 2.70 
The requirement of appropriation for private or personal use, has rightly been crit-
icized by both jurisprudence71 and literature72, as being too restrictive, especially due 
to the wording of footnote 47, which gives to the adversary the right of seizure of cul-
tural property, if the appropriation is justified by “military necessity”. The prohibition 
of Article 8 (2)(b)(xvi) is absolute and as such, it is legally inconsistent to add the “mili-
tary necessity” derogation.73 To recall the observations of France for the Revised 
Lauswolt Document and the Expert Meeting, the concept of “military necessity” is not 
arbitrary, it is strictly shaped by cumulative guarantees, including the demand for ex-
pressed provision and it should not be used as an additional justification, but rather as 
an additional guarantee for the protection of cultural property.74  
                                                                                                                                                           
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Lon-
don 8 August 1945, Article 6 (b): “plunder of public or private property”; Trial of the Major War Crimi-
nals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Judgement, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 
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d. Intentionally directing attacks against protected buildings in the context 
of non-international armed conflict. 
 
Article 8 (2)(e)(iv) is the non-international armed conflict analogue of Article 8 
(2)(b)(ix) and their established elements are significantly identical.75 The ICC has shed 
some light on further interpretation of this war crime in the Al Mahdi judgement. First, 
the Trial Chamber pinpointed the correctness of the legal characterization of the de-
fendant’s conduct under 8 (2) (e)(iv) given by the Prosecution, in terms of the specific 
intent of the defendant to attack protected cultural buildings.76 The ICC did not deem 
it necessary to consider any other legal characterizations, such as Article 8 (2)(e)(xii), 
because of its generic nature. Second, the ICC elaborates on the legal predecessors of 
this crime in an effort to prove the special status of cultural objects and to illustrate 
that the previous legal provisions did not distinguish among the protection during the 
hostilities of a conflict, or after the object had fallen under the control of the adver-
sary.77 Thirdly, the ICC reminds the legal difference among “governing attacks” in Arti-
cle 8 (2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute and punishing “destruction or wilful damage” of the 
ICTY Statute. The distinction among the different regimes is made crystal clear in Chap-
ter VI.78 
 
e. Pillage in the context of a non-international armed conflict  
 
Article 8 (2)(e)(v) is the twin provision of Article 8 (2)(b)(xvi) with identical ele-
ments adopted by the states parties. What is worth highlighting, is that the ICC in the 
Bemba decision, pinpointed the wide scope of application of this provision, since it en-
tails movable and immovable property, public or private, under the precondition it 
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surpasses sporadic acts.79 The SCSL in its Taylor judgement, abstained from the re-
quirement of organized appropriations and noticed that pillage covers also isolated 
acts of individuals.80 The Bemba decision did not require a “certain monetary value”, 
but it observed the need for ad hoc legal assessment, considering Article 1 and the 
preamble of Article 8 (2) (e).81  
 
B) Acts against cultural property which constitute war crimes under the Statute 
of the ICTY and respective jurisprudence 
 
Article 3 (d) of the ICTY Statute is the legal derivative of Articles 27 and 56 of the 
1907 Hague Regulations. Although its wording is nowhere to be seen in the Nuremberg 
Charter, the International Military Tribunal referred to Article 59 of the Hague Regula-
tions in Article VI (b) of the Charter which establishes the crime of “plunder of public or 
private property”.82 
To establish the material requirements of Article 3 (d), the institutions in question 
should be identified as dedicated to one of the descriptive categories at the time of the 
act, provided they were not being used for military purposes.83 The Strugar judgement 
explained that the protection of cultural property is afforded by customary interna-
tional law and as such it applies both in the context of an international as well as non-
international armed conflict.84 The cultural objects should not be placed in the imme-
diate proximity of military objectives as per the Blaskic judgement.85 However, as per 
the Naletilić judgement, such legal requirement is absent.86 The Strugar judgement 
pinpoints as an obiter dictum that it is not the location of cultural objects, but their use 
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which is decisive as to the waiver of their special legal protection. Yet, if military activi-
ties or military installations are in the immediate proximity of a cultural object, the at-
tack shall not be considered to be directed against that object, but rather against the 
approximate military targets.87 Thus, it is a question of examination on whether such 
installations amount to military objectives. Following this analysis in the Strugar case, 
the ICTY found that there were no military objects in the near proximity of the de-
stroyed buildings neither were these building used for military purposes. Hence, the 
defense of military necessity could not be established. 
Regarding the applicable mental element of Article 3 (d) of the ICTY Statute, the 
tribunal has established that the perpetrator must have attacked with intent and 
knowledge, the latter meaning “awareness that a circumstance exists.88In other words, 
the perpetrator must have acted with the knowledge and will of the result or in reck-
less disregard of the substantial likelihood of the destruction or damage. This finding is 
endorsed in the Blaskic, Kordic, Naletilic, Brjanin and Strugar judgements.89   
 
C) Critical analysis among the legal provisions  
The core of the challenge towards the reinforcement of implementation of IHL lies 
within the successful application of international criminal law. To meet this end, the 
mere highlighting of the most important elements of legal provisions would be superfi-
cial without attempting a thorough comparison. The key is to distinguish among the 
legal instruments considering the general approach of each one, which illuminates 
their strengths and weaknesses. Scholars have attempted to describe two main views: 
the civil-use and the culture-value approach.90 The traditional or civil-use orientation 
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stems from the long-established norms of IHL and thus, the focus is placed on the pro-
tection of civilians. The culture-value approach derives from the special protective sta-
tus of cultural objects depending on their societal value and gravity.  
In practical terms, the civil-use approach is evident in the Statutes of the interna-
tional and mixed criminal tribunals, i.e., the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL as well as the 
Statute of the permanent international criminal court, whereas the drafters of the 
1999 Second Protocol opted for progressiveness, which is encapsulated in the culture-
value orientation.  
The traditional civil-use point of view is mainly rooted in Article 6 of the Nurem-
berg Charter, the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Specifi-
cally, the wording of Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, which listed “plunder” in 
general terms and “wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity” has been transferred in similar expressions to Article 3 
(d) of the ICTY Statute and Article 7 of the Law on Extraordinary Chambers of Cambo-
dia, as well as Article 4 of the ICTR Statute and Article 3 of the SCSL, both of which pe-
nalize “pillage” as the unique war crime against cultural property.  
The comparison among the approaches is reflected on the following elements: 
First things first, the comparison among the civilian-use and cultural-value ap-
proach is evident in the provided definitions of cultural property. Specific traditional, 
civil-use IHL instruments, such as the ICTY in Article 3 (d) and the Rome Statute in Arti-
cle 8 (2) (b) (ix) do not provide for a definition. On the contrary, other IHL instruments 
of the same approach, such as the AP I 1977 in Articles 53 (1) and 85 (4) (d) or the AP II 
1977 in Article 16 attempt to give specific definitions of the protected objects.91 In a 
much more effective fashion, the 1999 Second Protocol in Article 15 directs to the ap-
plication of the 1954 Hague Convention for a culture-specific legal definition of pro-
tected property.  
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29 
 
The Rome Statute follows a general enumeration of protected objects including 
“places where the sick and wounded are collected” and “hospitals” without distinction 
to cultural objects in Articles 8 (2) (b) (ix) and (8 (2) (e) (iv), because of the very ra-
tionale of the civil-use approach: protection of civilian lives. This means that cultural 
objects are perceived exclusively within the context of civilian use during conflict.92 
The same approach of undistinguished objects characterizes the ICTY Statute in Article 
3 (d). Although hospitals are left out of its ambit, “institutions dedicated to education” 
remain.93 
In Article 3 (d) of the ICTY Statute, the lack of distinction among “institutions of 
education” and cultural objects, as well as the absence of graduation in gravity of crim-
inal offences depending on the value of the object lead to inadequate results. The 
most notable proof of this deficiency is the common application of Article 3 (d) by the 
ICTY for the destruction of a single small mosque and the horrendous shelling of the 
Old Town of Dubrovnik. In fact, the destruction of cultural property during the first 
seven months of 1991 of the Yugoslav war in Croatia surpassed in extent and signifi-
cance the cultural destruction during the four-year Yugoslav campaign of World War II. 
At the end of the day, Article 3 (d) may not be as precise as a criminal provision should 
be, but it is still the most detailed rule concerning cultural property within the Statute. 
For this reason, most charges have been brought on this basis. Conversely, the 1999 
Second Protocol in Article 15 adopts a differentiation in gravity of the offences, by 
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teaming them up, depending on whether the property was under enhanced protec-
tion, or whether the offences attract mandatory or permissive universal jurisdiction.94 
Thus, the 1999 Second Protocol holds merit as to its success to express retribution in 
line with the gravity of wrong-doing of each criminal offence. 
Despite the undistinguished language of Article 3 (d) of the ICTY Statute, its appli-
cation and interpretation by the tribunal illuminates its prerequisites. In the Jokic 
judgement, dealing inter alia with the destructive attack on the Old Town of Dubrov-
nik, the ICTY placed the appropriate amount of gravity on the offence, by accepting the 
Prosecution’s argumentation on the existence of an “intimate” linkage among the con-
temporary population with its ancient culture. The wrongfulness of the attack was sig-
nificantly aggravated due to the destructive consequences on the regional “history and 
heritage”, as well as the “cultural heritage of humankind”. Additionally, the court took 
into consideration the impossibility of restoration of the “original, historically authen-
tic material” as a characteristic of the “inherent value” of the buildings.95 The attack 
resulted in significant destruction of more than a hundred buildings, including walls of 
the town, all of which had been recognized at the time of the attack as a world herit-
age site, pursuant to the 1972 World Heritage Convention. The precondition of the 
awareness of the protected status at the time of the attack was also fulfilled.96  
The drafting of the ICTY Statute was almost simultaneously followed by the adop-
tion of the Rome Statute and the 1999 Second Protocol, which aptly reveal the bene-
fits of the culture-value approach over the civilian -use rationale.97  One of the reasons 
is the fact that movable cultural property is not protected in equal terms in the Rome 
Statute and the 1999 Second Protocol. In the Rome Statute, the only provision of crim-
inalization of acts against movable property in both contexts of conflict, is pillage, with 
all the criticism already analyzed.98 In the 1999 Second Protocol, however, Article 15 
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(1)(e) encompasses pillage and other offences which permit the inclusion of movable 
cultural objects.99  
Chapter V: Judgements of domestic jurisdiction and potential prosecution per 
ECCC 
In the first part of the analysis to follow, reference is made to the main points of 
national judgements of the Israeli jurisdiction.100 In the second part a proposal is sug-
gested, concerning the potential criminalization of crimes against cultural property un-
der the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (hereinafter referred to as: 
“ECCC”) Law.101 
 It is an established rule of customary IHL that an occupying power is under the le-
gal obligation to protect and preserve the cultural treasures, including archaeological 
treasures of the occupied state. 
The Supreme Court of Israel, sitting at the High Court of Justice in the Shikhur v. 
Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region confirmed the decision of a mili-
tary Israeli commander in the Occupied West Bank to use the military courts of the oc-
cupying state, instead of the local courts to prosecute persons that had breached the 
Jordanian Antiquities Law 1966 (No. 51), with the justification that the local courts had 
not treated the damage on antiquities with sufficient gravity. The Supreme Court of 
Israel interpreted Article 64 of the Geneva Convention IV 1949, in the sense that in 
principle the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function applying the 
                                                     
99 The 1999 Second Protocol in Article 1 (b) directs to the application of the 1954 Hague Convention Ar-
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penal laws of their own territory, unless there is necessity to ensure the effective ad-
ministration of justice. The court confirmed the customary nature of this rule.102  
In the Candu v. Minister of Defense, the Supreme Court of Israel upheld the deci-
sion of the Israeli occupation authorities in the West Bank to refuse the petition of an 
individual who wanted to build on his land, under the set in the Jordanian Antiquities 
Law 1996 precondition that a well, which formed part of the ancient pools of the King 
Solomon was not preserved in accordance to it. The Israeli authorities have assumed 
powers on the ancient antiquities in place of the Jordanian authorities and continue to 
apply the Jordanian Antiquities Law. The court reiterated the customary nature of the 
obligation of the occupied state to preserve the cultural treasures of the occupying 
state.103 
In the Hess v. Commander of the IDF in the West Bank, the same court pinpointed 
the obligation of the occupying state to enforce the legal rules for the protection of 
antiquities, in the case of absence for whatever reasons of the national authorities. 
The judgement upheld the decision of an Israeli military commander to demolish two 
and a half buildings, including a structure which formed part of the historic landscape 
of the Old City of Hebron, to prevent the attack of Palestinian militants. This decision 
was a revision of an initial one, which would have resulted in the destruction of Otto-
man and Mameluke buildings of the 15th century.104 The court emphasized the need of 
the supervisory presence of an expert and an archaeologist during demolition.105 The 
part of the destroyed cultural property in this case was used to shelter movable cultur-
al property in the sense of Article 4 (1) (b) of the 1954 Hague Convention. The focus of 
the court was on the Hague Rules, the Geneva Convention IV 1949 and the Hague Con-
vention 1954, without mentioning specific provisions. It is clear however, it referred to 
Article 43 of the Hague Rules, which establishes the legal obligation on the de facto 
occupying state to undertake all measures to ensure as far as possible the public order 
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and safety, including laws that protect and preserve cultural property. In addition, the 
court stated that the promulgation of law to prohibit pillage, theft, vandalism or mis-
appropriation of cultural property is obligatory, by virtue of the customary duty to 
prohibit, prevent or put a stop to these acts.106   
 The ECCC is a hybrid of national court established with international assistance 
with the jurisdictional mandate to prosecute the crimes committed by the senior lead-
ers of the Khmer Rouge regime during 1975 – 1979.107 Most of Cambodia’s 3,369 tem-
ples and 150 mosques of the Cham were destroyed, let alone irreparable damage 
caused on statutes and religious literature and items.  
The destruction of cultural property is encompassed within the jurisdiction of the 
court, but there are considerable difficulties in the practical application of the respec-
tive legal provisions. To begin with, Article 7 of the ECCC Law establishes jurisdiction 
against the responsible persons for the destruction of cultural property during armed 
conflict, as per the 1954 Hague Convention. Yet, Article 28 of the 1954 Hague Conven-
tion is not directly enforceable vis a vis individuals and its language is rather vague, 
contrary to the requirement that a criminal provision be precise and accurate. Fur-
thermore, the application of the 1954 Hague Convention demands for the existence of 
an armed conflict and a nexus among the criminal act and that conflict. This precondi-
tion is not obvious in the case of the Khmer Rouge regime. It is suggested that during 
1977 – 1978 there was an armed conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam and the re-
bellion in the end of 1978 amounted to an internal armed conflict in the Eastern Zone, 
but these are not established legal facts.108 Yet, the jurisprudence of the court estab-
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lishes the existence of an armed conflict throughout the entire time of the jurisdiction 
of the ECCC (17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979).109 
   The application of Article 6 of the ECCC Law regarding the grave breaches of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, such as the destruction of property not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly could be deemed applicable also for 
the criminalization of destructive acts against cultural property.110 The same problem 
of Article 7 emerges, concerning proof of the existence of armed conflict and the re-
quired nexus. Even more problems in the application of Article 6 generates the argu-
mentation of non-applicability of the grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
for non-international armed conflicts of common Article 3 for the period of the late 
1970s. This view is supported by the wording similarities among Article 3 of the ECCC 
Law with Article 2 of the ICTY Statute and its subsequent non-applicability by the tri-
bunal for violation of common Article 3 as war crimes.111 
Article 2 of the ECCC Law establishes the jurisdictional ambit of the court for inter 
alia breaches of laws or customs of war. However, the indication of such breaches 
does not clearly establish war crimes, as is the case in Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. As 
per Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, serious violations of humanitarian law constitute war 
crimes in both contexts of armed conflict. This finding was endorsed by the ICTY in the 
Tadic case.112 If one were to assert that Article 2 of the ECCC is similar to Article 3 of 
the ICTY, the crimes against cultural property would fall within its ambit, as violations 
of IHL and consequently it would be immaterial, whether such crimes took place in the 
context of an internal or an international armed conflict. Yet, the problem of proof of 
armed conflict at the exact time of the commission of the attacks against cultural 
monuments or objects and the establishment of the required nexus of the act to the 
general context remains unsolved. 
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A possible interpretative solution to the criminalization of crimes against cultural 
objects may offer the application of Article 5 of the ECCC Law on persecution as a 
crime against humanity. The prerequisites of the contextual “widespread” or “system-
atic” character of the attack and the “political”, “racial” or “religious” grounds for the 
direction of the attack should be considered with the same content as is the case in 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute, or Article 4 of the ICTR Statutes. It is recalled that these 
legal instruments criminalize acts as crimes against humanity, irrespective of the exist-
ence of war or peace. Thus, the existence of armed conflict and the nexus of the act to 
that conflict may be surpassed. Additionally, the discriminatory “religious” grounds of 
the destruction are also detectable in the anti-religious (anti-Buddhist) attacks of the 
Khmer Rouge regime. 
 
Chapter VI: Concluding observations and assessments 
In the Chapter to follow, specific elements of the analysis are illustrated in further 
detail, with the purpose of reaching a thorough understanding of the subject.  
De lege lata, the most suitable legal instrument for the establishment of criminal 
responsibility is the 1999 Second Protocol, which is oriented towards culture-value op-
tions, as analyzed. Most probably, a feasible three-fold proposal would be to: promote 
its further ratification, reinforce its implementation by states through the establish-
ment of bases of jurisdiction under Article 15, and domestic legislation on crimes 
against cultural property, which shall pave the way towards state practice and subse-
quent alterations in the Rome Statute.113   
As already stated, the legal debate on the inclusion of the “result” requirement in 
the material requirements of the crime of the intentional direction of attack against 
objects which are not military objectives in Article 8 (2)(b)(ii) in the context of interna-
tional and Article 8 (2)(e)(ii) for the non-international armed conflict was resolved dur-
ing the discussions of the delegates for the adoption of the Elements of Crimes. The 
prevailing majority view, based on the overall wording of Article 8 decided on the de-
liberate exclusion of the “result” requirement in the discussed provisions, and thus 
                                                     
113 See supra 90, pp. 216-217. 
36 
 
opted for a lower legal threshold, compared to the higher set standards in other provi-
sions of the very same Article.114 
It should be recalled at this point, that the Elements of Crimes are a primary legally 
binding source with the purpose to facilitate the interpretation and application of the 
respective Articles of the Rome Statute.115 Consequently, the prevalence of the majori-
ty view constitutes a promising advantage on the future criminalization of criminals of 
war. An instance of practical application of the benefits of the majority view is evident 
in the punishment of the relevant war crimes in the case of failure of the attack. Per 
the minority view, which is based on the similarities with Article 85 (4)(d) AP I, a failure 
of weapon constitutes an attempt and not the entire war crime, contrary to the cor-
rect majority opinion. 
The ICTY Statute in Article 3 (d) however, expressly provides for a “result” re-
quirement. This comes as no surprise, taken into consideration the traditional views of 
the drafters to faithfully follow the IHL provisions established in the 1977 Additional 
Protocols. The divergence in wording among the ICC and the ICTY should not invoke 
any frustration or dilemmas on the interpreter of law, due to the inclusion of the res-
ervation clause in Article 10 of the Rome Statute.116  
The notion of “military necessity” should be interpreted as an additional safeguard 
to the application of IHL and not as an exception for justification of violations. In this 
regard, it is useful to pinpoint a difference among the Rome Statute and its application 
and the jurisprudence of the ICTY.  
Article 8 (2) (b)(ix) and 8 (2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute establish for both contexts 
the war crime of intentional direction of attack against protected buildings, which are 
not military objectives. The choice of “military objective” instead of “military necessi-
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ty” constitutes a progressive step forward, due to the fact that the preferred option is 
more precise and concrete, as per Article 52 (2) of AP I. The Al Mahdi judgement reit-
erated the application of “military objective” and avoided any reference to justification 
by “military necessity”.117 The direction of the ICTY in this regard is different. In the 
Blaskic Trial Chamber judgement, the court used both concepts and stated that: “tar-
geting civilian property […] is an offence when not justified by military necessity”.118 
Yet, the Appeals Chamber reversed this legal finding, by rejecting any justification of 
“military necessity” and clarified the absolute character of the prohibition of targeting 
civilian property under IHL.119 The same finding was endorsed in the Strugar judge-
ment.120  
The progressiveness of the preference on “military objective” instead of “military 
purposes” or “military necessity” in the legal provisions which deal especially with 
crimes against cultural property in the Rome Statue, is not devoid of vulnerable points. 
Although the drafters criminalized the attack against cultural property, they did not 
insert the necessary legal counter-obligation on the other party not to use cultural 
property as a military objective. If the drafters of the Rome Statute had followed the 
example of Articles 85 4(d) and 53 (1), AP I, Article 16 of AP II and 4(1) of the 1954 
Hague Convention, it would be impossible to leave unpunished either the attackers or 
those who exposed the cultural property to destruction. De lege lata, the relevant le-
gal provisions of the Rome Statute leave a margin of improvement in terms of preven-
tive action and deterrent effectiveness.  
Apart from the concept of “military objective” in the legal provisions described 
above, the Rome Statute entails also acts of war crimes with specific reference to “mil-
itary necessity”, such as in Articles 8 (2)(a)(iv) or 8 (2)(b)(xiii). In such instances, “mili-
tary necessity” becomes a material requirement of the respective war crime and as 
such, its absence is required to be proven by the Prosecution.   
                                                     
117 See supra 76, paras. 11, 39. 
118 See supra 83, para. 180. 
119 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 29 July 2004, para 109. 
120 See supra 84, para. 280. 
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On the contrary, in the cases of war crimes in which no “military necessity” is fore-
seen, arises the legal question of whether Article 31 (1)(c) of the Rome Statute would 
be deemed applicable to justify a criminal act against cultural property. The ambiguity 
of this legal provision which excludes criminal responsibility in combination with the 
absence of a clear-cut definition of “military necessity” within the Rome Statute blur 
the limits of its invocation. Some commentators support that the defendant may use 
Article 31 (1)(c) as a defense argumentation, while others pinpoint its vague character, 
and thus, the need for its strict interpretation. 
The conviction of Al Mahdi by the permanent criminal court has been a case of 
firsts.121 It is the first time in the short history of the court, when an individual from 
Mali and member of an extremist Islamic group (Ansar Dine) is being convicted, the 
first charges brought exclusively for crimes against cultural property and the first guilty 
plea. The charges concerned the act of war crime of intentional direction of attack 
against protected cultural property of Article 8 (2)(e)(iv). The court established the 
context of an armed conflict not of an international character among the organized 
armed groups of Ansar Dine and AQUIM and the Malian governmental armed forces, 
as well as the association between the perpetrated attacks to the specific context.122 
 The criminal responsibility of the perpetrator was shaped by the gravity of the at-
tack against ten sites of religious and historic importance, nine of which were protect-
ed under the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention and they displayed integral 
role in the cultural life of Timbuktu. In this regard the court referred to the Constitu-
tion of UNESCO.123 The religious motives of the attack were also relevant to the as-
                                                     
121 Browden Andrea, A Case of Firsts for the International Criminal Court: Destruction of Cultural Herit-
age as a War Crime, Islamic Extremism and Guilty Plea, Opinio Juris, available online: 
http://opiniojuris.org/2016/08/09/emerging-voices-a-case-of-firsts-for-the-international-criminal-court-
destruction-of-cultural-heritage-as-a-war-crime-islamic-extremism-and-a-guilty-plea/, (last visited on: 31 
March 2017). 
122 See supra 76, para. 49: The court stated that Ansar Dine and AQUIM amounted to organized armed 
groups at the time of the attacks noting in particular their military capacity to displace the Malian gov-
ernmental armed forces, their ability to capture Timbuktu and exercise some form of government for a 
nine-month period. The degree of intensity of the conflict was also sufficient, surpassing mere internal 
disturbances and tensions.  
123 See supra 76, paras. 39, 46, 48-49. 
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sessment of the gravity.124 Yet, no aggravating, but mitigating circumstances were con-
sidered, including the guilty plea.125The Prosecutor of the ICC, Ms Fatou Bensouda, 
stressed the importance of this judgement for the development of an institutional 
practice that will encourage guilty pleadings to serve the interests of justice.  
Article 13 establishes restrictively three ways of exercise of jurisdiction: referral to 
the Prosecution by a state-party to the conflict, referral by the Security Council or pro-
pio motu investigation. For these reasons, the possibility of prosecution of the destruc-
tion of cultural heritage in Aleppo or Palmyra is very limited.126 First, the prosecution 
lacks territorial jurisdiction, because Syria is not a state party to the Rome Statute. 
Second, personal jurisdiction cannot be exercised, because the high-ranking members 
of ISIL are from Iraq or Syria, which are not states parties. The Prosecutor could pursue 
the mid-ranking members of ISIL, if they were nationals of member states to the Rome 
Statute, but this policy would be inconsistent with the objective of the court to prose-
cute those most culpable for committing crimes that are of concern to the internation-
al community. Third, the prosecution’s right to propio motu investigation impedes on 
Article 12 (2). Consequently, the referral of the Security Council to the Prosecution 
with the adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would surpass 
the hurdles of territorial or personal jurisdiction. However, the adoption of such a 
resolution may not be feasible in practice, because the US is a permanent member of 
the Security Council and would not prefer any investigation on these territories to 
bring the attention of the court to its own activities.  
 
 
                                                     
124 Ibid, para. 81. 
125 Ibid, para. 109: The court sentenced the perpetrator in nine years’ imprisonment after considering 
the following mitigating circumstances, i.e., the admission of guilt, the cooperation with the Prosecu-
tion, the expressed remorse and empathy to the victims, the initial reluctance to commit the crime and 
the steps taken to limit the damage and his good behavior in detention. 
126 Brennan Anna Marie, Prosecuting ISIL before the International Criminal Court: Challenges and Obsta-
cles, Vol. 19, 17 September 2015, available online: 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/21/prosecuting-isil-international-criminal-court-
challenges-and-obstacles, (last visited on: 31 March 2017). 
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